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I. INTRODUCTION
Once considered the exception and not the rule,' application
of the doctrine of equivalents has become the second prong of
patent infringement litigation.2 Outright duplication is a rare
form of infringement and the doctrine of equivalents is a readily
available means of extending protection beyond the scope of the
claims.' To the displeasure of many patent practitioners, the
doctrine of equivalents is mired in considerable ambiguity and
uncertainty.
Even after twelve years of Federal Circuit precedents, much is
left to be decided regarding application of the doctrine.4 The
patent community continues to struggle to develop an analysis
that is both equitable and predictable. A careful review of recent
precedents, however, suggests an analysis may be forming
through the confusion.
This Article analyzes the doctrine of equivalents as the doc-
trine is currently applied by the Federal Circuit in patent in-
fringement cases. Part II provides a brief background on patents
and patent infringement generally. Part III discusses the origin
and purpose of the doctrine of equivalents. Part IV analyzes the
1. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
The court stated "the doctrine of the equivalents is the exception ... not the rule." Id.
The court reasoned that if the doctrine of equivalents was made a part of every infringe-
ment charge, then patent claims would no longer serve their intended purpose and
competitors will never know if their actions infringe an existing patent. Id.
2. See, e.g., Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (explaining the purpose and application of the doctrine).
3. Claims define the subject matter, novelty, and nonobviousness of the invention
protected by the patent or protection sought for in the application for patent. "The
specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and dis-
tinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35
U.S.C. § 112, 2 (1988).
4. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has had exclusive
jurisdiction to hear appeals of patent infringement cases since it was created in 1982.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1292, 1295, 1338 (1988). Jens H. Hillen, The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit: Independent Review of Patent Decisions and the Constitutional Facts Doctrine, 67 S. CAL.
L. REv. 187, 189-90 (1993). Prior to 1982, the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals had jurisdiction over patent litigation appeals. See generally Charles W.
Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More than a National Patent Court, 49
Mo. L. REv. 43 (1984) (discussing Congress's intent to insure uniformity in the national
patent law).
For patent practitioners, the Federal Circuit is effectively the court of last resort
because the United States Supreme Court rarely accepts patent cases for review. In the
past four years, the United States Supreme Court has heard two patent cases. See Cardi-
nal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1967 (1993); Eli Lily & Co. v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
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application of the doctrine in the Federal Circuit. Part V exam-
ines some significant limitations to the applicability of the doc-
trine. Part VI presents other considerations affecting the use of
the doctrine and Part VII sets out a number of recommenda-
tions for clarifying the doctrine. Finally, this Article concludes
with a brief comment on the debate surrounding the doctrine of
equivalents and the significance future resolution of that debate
will have for patent law practitioners.
II. OVERVIEW OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS
A. Background
The progress of science and the useful arts is promoted when
an invention is disclosed to the public, thus adding to the sum of
all knowledge.5 The economic theory behind patent rights is
that the best way to advance the public welfare is by encouraging
effort through personal gain.6 Moreover, sacrifice and effort de-
voted to creative activities deserve rewards.
7
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective . . . discoveries."8 Congress has implemented this
power through the Patent Act9 which gives the patentee' the
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the inven-
5. See Christopher S. Marchese, Promoting the Progress of the Useful Arts by Narrowing
Best Mode Disclosure Requirements in Patent Law, U. Prrr. L. REv. 589, 589 (1993) (noting
that policies underlying the Constitution's patent system clause are intended to pro-
mote "innovation, advancement and addition to the sum of useful knowledge").
6. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), reh g denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954).
See also Christopher S. Marchese, Confusion, Uncertainty and the Best Mode Requirement, 2
FED. CiRC. B.J. 1, 4 n.19 (1992).
7. Marchese, supra note 6, at 6 (granting exclusive right to make, use, and sell
inventions provides patent owners a "formidable right, and through it [they] may profit
handsomely").
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1988). The rules of practice in patent cases are set forth in
37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.825 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
10. The term "patentee" "includes not only the patentee to whom the patent was
issued but also the successors in title to the patentee." 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (1988).
19941
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tion'1 for seventeen years.1 2 In exchange for this right, the pat-
entee must disclose the invention to the public.
13
In order to secure the right to the invention, an inventor must
file an application with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO). The application must contain a complete descrip-
tion of the invention in sufficient detail so that a person skilled
in the art to which the invention pertains can practice the inven-
tion.14 The application must conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject mat-
ter that the inventor regards as the invention.1 5 After examina-
tion, if allowed,16 the Commissioner issues the inventor, who
becomes the patentee, a patent.
1 7
Patent infringement occurs when any individual acting with-
out authority makes, uses, or sells a patented invention within
11. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). An invention is defined as an "invention or discovery."
35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (1988).
12. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) (17 years for a utility patent). However, a design patent
is limited to 14 years. See 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1988). A design patent is an invention of
"any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture." 35 U.S.C.
§ 171 (1988).
13. The statutory requirements as set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 1 provide:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which the inven-
tion pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor in carry-
ing out his invention.
Id.
Thus, the requirements for disclosure are threefold: a descriptive requirement, an
enablement requirement, and a best mode requirement The purpose of the descrip-
tive requirement is to convince those skilled in the art to which the invention pertains
that the inventor has invented the claimed subject matter. See, e.g., Stiftung v. Renishaw
PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1181-82 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The enablement requirement must
teach someone skilled in the art how to practice the invention. In re Sherwood, 613
F.2d 809, 816 (C.C.P.A. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981). Finally, if the inventor
conceals a better mode for carrying out the invention than that described in the specifi-
cation, a resulting patent may be held unenforceable. Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus.
Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The purpose for holding a patent unenforce-
able when the inventor conceals a better mode is to "restrain inventors from applying
for patents while at the same time concealing from the public preferred embodiments
of their inventions which they have in fact conceived." Chemcast Corp., 913 F.2d at 926.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (1988).
15. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75 (Supp. 1992). The application must also include a drawing if
necessary under section 113, an oath stating that the patentee believes himself to be the
original inventor as required under section 115, and the appropriate fees. 35 U.S.C.
§ 111 (1988).
16. An application for a patent is examined by the PTO to determine whether the
applicant is entitled to a patent under the law. 35 U.S.C. § 131 (1988).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 13 (1988).
1036 [Vol. 20
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the United States during the patent's term of effectiveness.18
Patent infringement is a tort, 9 and the patentee can seek a rem-
edy through a civil action.2" Remedies include injunctive re-
lief,2 ' damages, and possibly attorney fees.23
B. Determining Infringement
Determining patent infringement is a two-step process. 24 First,
the claims of the patent must be construed or interpreted to de-
termine their meaning and scope. 25 Second, the properly con-
strued claims must be applied to the allegedly infringing, or
accused, device.26
The first step, interpreting the claims, involves a determina-
tion of what the claimed invention is in light of, inter alia, the
specification, claims, prior art, and prosecution history.27 Claim
construction is a question of law.28 Claim interpretation, how-
ever, must be based on facts established by evidence. 29 This may
require reference to the application, prosecution history, and
expert testimony to determine what the claims mean to a person
18. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. IV 1992).
19. Allen Organ Co. v. Elka, S.P.A., 615 F. Supp. 328, 330 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1988).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1988).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988). Treble damages may also be available. Id.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1988) (attorney fees are awarded in exceptional cases). See,
e.g., Xantech Corp. v. Ramco Indus., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (al-
lowing attorney fees when infringer is found guilty of bad faith, fraud, or gross
negligence).
24. Read Corp. v. Protec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992), reh g denied, Sept.
23, 1992.
25. ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
26. Id.
27. Prosecution history includes material representations made by an applicant for
patent to the PTO during examination of the application. After a patent has been
issued, all papers relating to the case are open to inspection by the public, and copies
may be obtained from the PTO. 37 C.F.R. § 1.11 (1988).
28. Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(stating claim interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo).
29. Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
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of ordinary skill in the art. 0 Federal Circuit precedent remains
ambiguous in defining the jury's role in claim interpretation.
3 1
The second step, application of the properly construed claims
to the accused device, is a question of fact.32 Once the district
court has properly construed the claims, the claims must be
compared to the accused device to determine whether the ac-
cused device infringes the patent either literally or through the
doctrine of equivalents.3 3
1. Literal Infringement
Literal infringement is established if and only if all the limita-
tions of the claims are found in the accused device exactly.34 All
claim elements are essential and necessary in this determina-
tion. 5 If the accused device does not contain all the patentee's
claims exactly, there can be no finding of literal infringement.
36
One manner in which a claim element may be specified is in
means-plus-function language.3 7 For claim elements expressed
in means-plus-function terms,38 section 112, paragraph 6 of the
30. Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft M.b.H., 945
F.2d 1546, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (describing what evidence ajury may use in interpret-
ing the language of the disputed claim).
31. Mark D. Janis, Judge and Juiy Roles in Equivalents Analysis: Commentary on Malta v.
Schulmerich Carillons, 74J. PAT. & TRaDEMaK OFF. Soc'y 621, 625 (1992) (recognizing
that with regard to "extrinsic evidence" that is prosecution history or expert testimony,
claim interpretation should generally be in the province of the jury, otherwise the situa-
tion is unclear).
32. See King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986) (stating that 35 U.S.C. § 112 calls for "claim construc-
tion covering equivalents of the described embodiments" and that the scope of these
equivalents is a question of fact).
33. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870-71 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting
that prosecution history estoppel is a limitation of the doctrine of equivalents "after the
claims have been properly interpreted and no literal infringement is found").
34. Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (recognizing that
35 U.S.C. § 112 1 6 "can never provide a basis for finding that a means-plus-function
claim element is met literally where the function part of the element in not literally met
in an accused device").
35. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (citing Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
36. Johnston, 885 F.2d at 1580.
37. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, 16 (1988).
38. An example of a claim element in means-plus-function terms is "means for
stopping the rotation of the wheel," which may include a disk brake or a drum brake.
When claim elements are stated in means-plus-function language, each ele-
ment is "construed to cover [a] corresponding structure in an accused appara-
tus which both (1) performs the same function, and (2) is the same as, or
1038 [Vol. 20
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Patent Act provides explicit guidelines for interpretation of
meaning and scope:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as
a means or step for performing a specified function without
recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and
such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.
3 9
Thus, section 112, paragraph 6, as interpreted today, operates
to limit the means that satisfy the claim language.4 ° Correctly
construed claims are limited to the embodiments of the inven-
tion as described in the specification.41 For an accused device to
literally infringe a patent employing a means-plus-function lan-
guage claim, the patentee must show that the structure in the
accused device is the same or equivalent4 2 and performs the
identical functions as disclosed in the specification.4"
2. Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
If the accused device falls within the claims, infringement is
established and the infringement analysis is concluded.44 If lit-
eral infringement does not exist, however, infringement may still
be found if the accused device "performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result
[as the claimed invention].""5 This constitutes infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents.
reasonably equivalent to, the particular structure disclosed in the specification
for performing that function.
George E. Badenoch, Trial of Infringement Issues: How to Prove Infringement and Nonin-
fringement in PA. LrrIG. 1993, at 393, 396 (PLI Litig. & Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks,
and Lit. Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-3909, 1993).
39. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 6 (1988).
40. See infra part VI.B discussing the limiting effect of § 112.
41. See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934-35 (Fed.
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988) (citing Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
42. See infra part VI.B discussing equivalents in means-plus-function claims.
43. See, e.g., Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042-44 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (finding the trial court erred by not examining the specification "to identify the
disclosed means and to determine whether Reinke used equivalents thereof").
44. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950), reh'g
denied, 340 U.S. 845 (1950) (stating "[i]f accused matter falls clearly within the claim,
infringement is made out and that is the end of it").
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The only exceptions or limitations to the doctrine of
equivalents are that the doctrine cannot encompass either sub-
ject matter covered by prior art or subject matter given up dur-
ing prosecution of the patent for the claimed invention.46
Through the application of the doctrine of equivalents, the Fed-
eral Circuit has introduced ambiguity and uncertainty surround-
ing the scope of patent claims.4
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
A. Origins
The 1853 case of Winans v. Denmead8 was the United States
Supreme Court's first discussion of the doctrine of equivalents.4 9
The patentee's claimed invention was for manufacturing a rail-
road car out of a sheet of iron with the upper part being cylindri-
cal and the lower part in the form of a fustrum cone. 50 The
defendant's accused device was for an octagonal and pyramidal
car.51 The structure, the mode of operation, and the results at-
tained were the same for both the claimed invention and the
accused device.5" Recognizing that the whole substance of the
invention may be copied over the form of the invention,55 the
Court was compelled to look through the form of the invention
to its substance to determine what rights the patent was designed
to secure.54
46. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 n.1 (Fed. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
47. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (not-
ing that if the doctrine of equivalents is not the exception but rather the rule, the
public will come "to believe (or fear) that the language of patent claims can never be
relied on").
48. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
49. See Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 960 (Newman, J., commentary) (stating "the Supreme
Court's first discussion of the principles of equivalency appeared in Winans v. Den-
mead"). Prior to the Patent Act of 1836, patents were granted to anyone who applied
and fulfilled the formal requirements, such as filing the necessary papers and payment
of the required fee. PJ. Federico, Preface to 35 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1954) (commentary on
the new Patent Act). The Act of 1793 did not provide for patent examinations or pat-
ent claims, although the Act did subject applications to some review. Id. However,
judicial determinations of equivalency were made well before Winans v. Denmead and
the Act of 1836. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 957-58.
50. Winans, 56 U.S. at 330.
51. Id. at 331-32.
52. Id. at 332.
53. Id. at 340.
54. Id. at 342. Often, a practioner will insert a paragraph at the end of the descrip-
tion of the preferred embodiments to lend itself to alternatives. A typical closing may be
1040 [Vol. 20
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Later, in Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse,55 the Court
found that infringement requires more than finding correspon-
dence of the claims of the patentee's invention with the claims
or limitations of the accused device.56 Rather, the analysis re-
quires a finding of whether the accused device indeed appropri-
ates the invention.57 The Court stated:
[A] n infringement "is a copy of the thing described in the
specification of the patentee, either without variation, or with
such variations as are consistent with its being in substance
the same thing. If the invention of the patentee be a
machine, it will be infringed by a machine which incorporates
in its structure and operation the substance of the invention;
that is, by an arrangement of mechanism which performs the
same service or produces the same effect in the same way, or
substantially the same way."
58
The Court's most recent application of the doctrine of
equivalents occurred in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v.
Linde Air Products Co. 9 This decision is credited with enunciat-
of the form: "Although the invention has been described in considerable detail with
reference to certain preferred versions thereof, other versions are possible. Therefore,
the spirit and scope of the appended claims should not be limited to the description of
the preferred versions contained herein."
Interestingly, the Winans Court held that such a paragraph is unnecessary because
the law will provide such protection for the patentee by interpreting the claim in this
manner even absent the additional paragraph. Winans, 56 U.S. at 343.
55. 170 U.S. 537 (1897).
56. Id. at 568.
57. Id. The Westinghouse Court is also considered to have created a reverse doctrine
of equivalents:
But even if it be conceded that the Boyden device corresponds with the letter
of the Westinghouse claims, that does not settle conclusively the question of
infringement. We have repeatedly held that a charge of infringement is some-
times made out, though the letter of the claims be avoided .... The converse
is equally true. The patentee may bring the defendant within the letter of [the
patentee's] claims, but if the [defendant] has so far changed the principle of
the device that the claims of the patent, literally construed, have ceased to
represent his actual invention, he is as little subject to be adjudged an in-
fringer as one who has violated the letter of a statute has to be convicted, when
he has done nothing in conflict with its spirit and intent. "An infringement
• .. involves substantial identity, whether that identity be described by the
terms, 'same principle', same 'modus operandi', or any other."
Id. at 568 (citation omitted) (quoting Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 572
(1863)). See generally William S. Galliani, Patent Infringement Against R.apidly Evolving
Technologies: New Equivalents, the Doctrine of Equivalents and the Reverse Doctrine of
Equivalents, 6 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J., 75 (1990) (discussing the role
of the reverse doctrine of equivalents in judicial analysis in patent protection cases).
58. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 569 (quoting Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 573
(1863).
59. 339 U.S. 607 (1950).
1994]
9
Hofmann: The Doctrine of Equivalents: Twelve Years of Federal Circuit Prec
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WILLIAM M/TCHELL LAW REVIEW
ing the modern standards for applying the doctrine.6" Under
Graver Tank, while a patent may not be literally infringed, in-
fringement may be found if the accused device performs sub-
stantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to
obtain substantially the same result as the claimed invention.61
To hold otherwise, wrote the Court, would convert the patent
grant into a hollow and useless thing:
6 2
Outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare
type of infringement. To prohibit no other would.., be sub-
ordinating substance to form. It would deprive [the inventor]
of the benefit of his invention and would foster concealment
rather than disclosure of inventions, which is one of the pri-
mary purposes of the patent system.
63
The Court expressed concern for the possibility of the unscrupu-
lous copyist making insubstantial changes that would be enough
to take the copied matter outside the claim and thus outside the
reach of law."
B. Purpose
The doctrine of equivalents was ostensibly devised to do eq-
uity. This doctrine evolved from a balancing of competing poli-
cies that serve the purpose of promoting the useful arts.65 On
the one hand, claims must be particular and distinct 66 so the
public has fair notice of what constitutes the metes and bounds
of the claimed invention.67
60. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
61. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608. Justice Jackson wrote:
[W] here a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it
performs the same or similar function in a substantially different way, but nev-
ertheless falls within the literal words of the claim, the doctrine of equivalents
may be used to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee's action for
infringement.
339 U.S. at 608-9 (citing Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 568
(1897)).
62. Id. at 607.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
66. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
67. London, 946 F.2d at 1538. The court wrote:
Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception, however, not the
rule, for if the public comes to believe (or fear) that the language of patent
claims can never be relied on, and that the doctrine of equivalents is simply
the second prong of every infringement charge, regularly available to extend
protection beyond the scope of the claims, then claims will cease to serve their
[Vol. 20
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"On the other hand, the patentee should not be deprived of
the benefits of his patent by competitors who appropriate the
essence . . . while barely avoiding the literal language of the
claims."' 8 To that end, Westinghouse requires application of a doc-
trine of equivalents analysis, when plead, in order to show patent
infringement.69 The effort to balance these competing policies
has unfortunately led to conflicting results.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
A. Background
Commentators argue that an equitable remedy such as the
doctrine of equivalents should not be reduced to a mechanical
formula.7" Such a policy, however, creates uncertainty in the as-
sessment of the likely outcome of patent infringement litigation,
and in the assessment of acceptable parameters for "designing
around" an invention.71
Although the Graver Tank Court put forth the now familiar
tripartite "function/way/result" test as a method of demonstrat-
ing that the accused device is substantially equivalent to the
intended purpose. Competitors will never know whether their actions infringe
a granted patent.
Id. Ironically, Justice Black, in his dissent in Graver Tank, wrote, "One need not be a
prophet to suggest that today's rhapsody on the virtue of the 'doctrine of equivalents'
will... make enlargement of patent claims the 'rule' rather than the 'exception.' " 339
U.S. at 616 (Black, J., dissenting).
Justice Black also drew a correlation between the doctrine of equivalents and pat-
ent reissues. Id. at 615. Whenever any patent is found to contain errors that render the
patent wholly or partially invalid, the Commissioner may reissue the patent in accord-
ance with a reissue application. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988). Such error may include the
patentee claiming more or less than he or she had a right to claim in the patent. Id.
The term of the reissue patent is for the unexpired term of the original patent. Id.
68. London, 946 F.2d at 1538.
69. Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 538 (1897).
70. E.g., Harold C. Wegner, The Doctrine of Equivalents After London, 74 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 67, 71 (1992).
71. See, e.g., Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992), reh'g denied,
Sept. 23, 1992:
We have often noted that one of the benefits of the patent system is the incen-
tive it provides for "designing around" patented inventions, thus creating new
innovations .... Of course, determining when a patented device has been
"designed around" enough to avoid infringement is a difficult determination
to make. One cannot know for certain that changes are sufficient to avoid
infringement until a judge or jury has made that determination.
Id. at 828 (citation omitted).
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claim limitations,72 the Federal Circuit has stated that the tripar-
tite test is not necessarily the only method to be used in doctrine
of equivalents analysis.7  The Federal Circuit, instead, has re-
fused to adopt a formula for general applicability.' 4 Neverthe-
less, the Federal Circuit has overwhelmingly applied the
tripartite test in doctrine of equivalents matters.
75
Despite the position that the court is not bound to any rigid
formula when applying the doctrine of equivalents, a review of
precedents outlines a general method of analysis. Once literal
infringement is found lacking, the court may apply the doctrine
of equivalents. First, the court must-compare the claimed inven-
tion to the accused device. 7'6 The tripartite test may be utilized
as the method of comparison to determine equivalence. 7" De-
pending on the forum of the suit, the patentee has certain evi-
dentiary burdens and thresholds to surpass in order to show
equivalence. 78 If equivalency is found, there still may be no in-
fringement if the equivalency comparison would encompass the
prior art or be barred by prosecution history estoppel.79
The doctrine of equivalents was designed to do equity, which
is evidently different than an equitable remedy. A finding of
equivalence is a determination of fact.8 ° Proof of equivalence
may be made in any form.81 As with any other issue of fact, the
determination of equivalence requires the balancing of credibil-
ity, persuasiveness, and weight of the evidence. 2 Equivalence is
72. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 607, 608 (1950)
(stating that patentee may invoke the doctrine of equivalents if a device performs the
same function in the same way to obtain the same result).
73. See, e.g., Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
1991), reh'g denied, 959 F.2d 923 (1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2942 (1992) (stating that
"[w] hile comparison of function/way/result is an acceptable way of showing that struc-
ture in an accused device is the 'substantial equivalent' of a claim limitation, it is not the
only way to do so").
74. See id. (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1361 (Fed.
Cir. 1983)).
75. Wegner, supra note 70, at 68.
76. See infra part IV.B.
77. See infra part IV.C.2.
78. See infra part IV.C.3.
79. See infra part V.
80. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 607, 609 (1950).
81. Types of proof that may be used include, but are not limited to, testimony of
experts or others versed in the technology, documents such as textbooks and treatises,
and disclosure of the prior art. Id.
82. Id. at 609-10.
[Vol. 201044
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to be determined by the trial court and that determination
should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.88
Viewed in this broad fashion, the analysis appears straightfor-
ward. Actual application of the doctrine of equivalents, though,
is replete with ambiguity.
B. Comparison of the Invention to the Accused Device
A doctrine of equivalents analysis begins with a comparison of
the patented invention to the accused device.8 4 The Federal Cir-
cuit considers at least two different approaches in undertaking
this comparison. These are the "element by element" ap-
proach85 and the "as a whole" approach." The "element by ele-
ment" approach requires an equivalent for each claim in order
to find infringement.8 7 The "as a whole" approach simply re-
quires an equivalence between the invention and the accused
device.88
Only comparisons of the claimed invention to the accused de-
vice are used to determine equivalence.89 The court does not
consider comparisons of the claimed invention to another ad-
mittedly infringing device.90 However, simply because an ac-
cused device is patented does not necessarily mean it is not
equivalent to the claimed invention and the court will consider a
comparison of a patented yet accused device to the claimed
invention.91
83. Id. at 610 (applying the general principles of appellate review).
84. See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988) (holding that the district court was correct in
comparing the structure of the patented device to the structure of the accused device).
85. See, e.g., id. (applying element by element approach to a claim for infringement
of a fruit sorter patent by comparing the specific components of each machine).
86. See, e.g., Spectra Corp. v. Lutz, 839 F.2d 1579, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (comparing
marketing sublimination dye toners to determine if they perform substantially the same
function in the same way to reach the same result).
87. Pennwalk 833 F.2d at 935 (quoting Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538,
1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
88. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 607, 608 (1950)
(explaining the theory behind the "as a whole" approach).
89. See Datascope Corp. v. Kontron Inc., 786 F.2d 398, 400 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (refus-
ing to compare accused device to a similar device that had been previously found to
infringe).
90. Id.
91. See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir.
1984). The issuance of a patent only raises a presumption of validity, not a presump-
tion of noninfringement. Id. at 1581 (citing Freeman v. Altvater, 66 F.2d 506, 512 (8th
Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 696 (1933)). However, the party attacking validity must
1994]
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1. "Element by Element" Approach
The court in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.,92 held
that in order to find infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, an equivalent is required for each claim element.9"
In order to find infringement, all claimed elements must either
be found, or have an equivalent, in the accused device.94 When
the accused device does not contain either the exact element
of the claim or that element's equivalent, there is no
infringement.9 5
The court modified this approach when applying the doctrine
of equivalents analysis in Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec.
U.S.A., Inc.96 In attempting to explain the reasoning of Pennwalt
and clarify what is meant by "element,"97 the Corning Glass court
stated that the term "element" was ambiguous and that the
Pennwalt court instead meant to establish a "claims limitations"
approach.9" In order to find infringement under the "claims
limitations" approach, each and every limitation of the claim
must be found in the accused device either exactly or by substan-
tial equivalent.99
overcome the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 1573. See generally
35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988) (presuming patents valid). Furthermore, a patent does not give
the patentee the right to make use or sell the invention. Instead, it merely gives the
patentee the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention. 35
U.S.C. § 154 (1992).
92. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
93. Id. at 935. "Claims in patents are typically drafted in the form of a preamble,
transition and one or more elements. Each element constitutes a limitation or narrow-
ing of the scope of the claim." Id. at 949 (NiesJ., additional views) (quoting 4 DONALD
S. CHISUM, PATENTs § 18.03[4] (1986)).
94. See id. at 935-36 (comparing the claimed elements of each device).
95. See, e.g., id. at 935.
96. 868 F.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
97. Id. at 1259.
98. Id. The court stated that "[references to 'elements' can be misleading ....
[C]larity is advanced when sufficient wording is employed to indicate when 'elements' is
intended to mean a component... of an embodiment of an invention and when it is
intended to mean a feature set forth in or as a limitation in a claim." Id. at 1259 n.5
(quoting Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1533 n.9
(Fed. Cir. 1987)).
99. Id. at 1259. There is yet no agreement on how to determine whether an ele-
ment is a "substantial equivalent." Ronald E. Larson, Balancing the Competing Policies
Underlying the Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law, 21 AIPLA Qj.. 1, 4 (1993) (proposing
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The court amended this "claims limitation" approach in Sun
Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equipment Leasing, Inc' While comparing
every limitation of the claims to the accused device, the finding
of infringement does not require a one for one correspondence
of components. 10 1 Infringement cannot be avoided by combin-
ing several operations that are claimed as separate operations.
10 2
The application and interpretation of the "element by element"
approach continues to vary from case to case.1
0 3
2. "As a Whole" Approach
Although the Federal Circuit appears to apply an expanded
"element by element" approach when comparing the claimed in-
vention to the accused device, Supreme Court precedent re-
quires an application of the "as a whole" approach.'04 From the
first Supreme Court case addressing the doctrine of equivalents,
Winans,"0 5 to Graver Tank,'"6 the Court has not used a rigid test
100. 872 F.2d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 892 F.2d 73 (1989).
101. Id. (stating "[o]ne to one correspondence of components is not required, and
elements or steps may be combined without ipso facto loss of equivalency").
102. Id.
103. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
104. The latest Supreme Court case involving the doctrine of equivalents, Graver
Tank, is regarded as applying the "as a whole" approach. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-
Wayland Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 945 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988) (Ben-
nett, J., dissenting) (stating that the teachings of Graver Tank require an "as a whole"
analysis when applying the doctrine of equivalents); Roy Collins, III, The Doctrine of
Equivalents: Rethinking the Balance Between Equity and Predictability, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REv. 285, 300 (1992) (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court's perspective in Graver Tank is
that of the invention 'as a whole' "). See also Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse,
170 U.S. 537, 568 (1897); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343 (1853). But
see Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 953 (NiesJ., additional views) (stating "[t]he expression 'inven-
tion as a whole' does not appear in Graver Tank... "). The association of Graver Tank
with the expression "invention as a whole" first appeared in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 953 (Nies, J., addi-
tional views).
105. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853). The Winans Court stated:
Where form and substance are inseparable, it is enough to look at the form
only. Where they are separable; where the whole substance of the invention
may be copied in a different form, it is the duty of courts and juries to look
through the form for the substance of the invention-for that which entitled
the inventor to his patent, and which the patent was designed to secure; where
that is found, there is an infringement; and it is not a defence (sic], that it is
embodied in a form not described, and in terms claimed by the patentee.
Id. at 342.
106. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950), reh'g
denied, 340 U.S. 845 (1950) (stating "[w]hat constitutes equivalency must be determined
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in applying the doctrine of equivalents. Instead, the analysis
consistently turned on the totality of the circumstances. 10 7 The
Court applied the doctrine of equivalents to the invention as a
whole, or to parts thereof, in accordance with the principles of
equity.'
0 8
Recently, in Spectra Corp. v. Lutz," 9 the Federal Circuit applied
the "as a whole" approach in ruling there was infringement in
the case at bar." 0 In at least two other cases since Pennwalt, the
court reached similar conclusions by applying analytical models
more similar to the "as a whole" approach than to the "element
by element" approach.11" ' Commentators have observed that the
Federal Circuit uses the "as a whole" approach when the court
has an expansive view of the claims, and uses the "element by
element" approach for restrictive interpretations of the
claims.' 1
2
3. Distinguishing the Approaches
Because these two analytical models are both still applied in
patent cases, one must be aware of their differences. The "ele-
ment by element" approach digresses from the precedents set by
Graver Tank and its antecedents which require more than a com-
parison of parts. Thus, claiming an invention requires more than
merely listing parts of the structure. A claim also requires a de-
scription of functional or structural cooperation of the parts." 3
Old elements are permissible, and often necessary, but it is the
elements and the cooperation of those elements that comprise
107. For an exhaustive review of Supreme Court and Federal Circuit application of
the doctrine of equivalents, see Judge Newman's commentary in Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at
954-75.
108. Id. at 959-63.
109. 839 F.2d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
110. Id. at 1582 (finding there was no infringement because, although the function
of the devices were broadly the same, the methods of performing that function and
results obtained were entirely different).
111. See Durango Assoc., Inc. v. Reflange, Inc., 843 F.2d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(ignoring the presence of a claim limitation that would have otherwise brought the
accused device within the range of equivalents); W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock,
Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (requiring the patentee to establish that the
accused device produced the same overall result).
112. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 104, at 300.
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what the patentee regards as the invention.1 14 The "element by
element" approach's consideration of each element or limita-
tion, regardless of whether the limitation is novel, improperly
places too much importance on what may otherwise be elements
that are insignificant to the "invention."
For an approach to be consistent with the principles of equity,
consideration must be given to the true substance of the inven-
tion. Additionally, consideration must be given to whether the
accused device employs the invention or its equivalent. Such an
approach gives the greatest weight to the points of novelty or to
the invention itself, while giving lesser weight to subordinate
components that comprise the structure of the invention.
The analysis most consistent with Supreme Court precedent
and the principles of equity first isolates the components consid-
ered the "point of novelty" or the true "invention" of the claim
and then determines whether the accused device's correspond-
ing components are either equivalent or novel before consider-
ing the subordinate or ancillary elements when comparing the
claimed invention to the accused device "as a whole." Such an
approach apparently has not been widely followed by the Fed-
eral Circuit because Pennwalt remains the controlling law of the
Federal Circuit.11 5
C. Determining Equivalence
After determining the method of comparison, the court ap-
plies a test to determine if the claimed invention is substantially
equivalent to the accused device. How equivalency is deter-
mined, though, varies from case to case due to many variables,
including the form of the claim; the nature of the invention de-
fined by the claim; and the kind of limitation that is not literally
met.1
6
114. E.g., Larson, supra note 99, at 4; see generally William I. Wyman, Functional State-
ments in Claims, 4J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OF. Soc'. 433, 438-39 (1922) ("a patentable
combination may be made up of concededly old elements").
115. See generally Richard M. Klein, Establishing Infringement Under the Doctrine of
Equivalents after Malta, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 5, 18 (1993) ("While the
dispute continues in the Federal Circuit, it is clear that the 'element-by-element' ap-
proach, as opposed to the 'claim as a whole' entirety approach to equivalence, remains
the controlling precedent in the Federal Circuit.").
116. Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1991), reh'g
denied, 959 F.2d 923 (1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2994 (1992).
19941 1049
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In assessing the equivalence of an accused device, the court
must recognize that the doctrine of equivalents does not prevent
the manufacture, use, or sale by others of all generally similar
devices." 7 Though an invention may be entitled to some range
of equivalents, "a court may not, under the guise of applying the
doctrine of equivalents, erase a plethora of meaningful struc-
tural and functional limitations.., on which the public is enti-
tled to rely in avoiding infringement.""' ,
1. Equivalence Triable to aJuty or to the Bench
As noted, a finding of equivalence is a determination of
fact.119 While factual determinations may be made by ajudge or
jury, the Seventh Amendment provides that the right to a trial by
jury shall be preserved in suits at common law.120 Moreover, the
Seventh Amendment extends to causes of action created by Con-
gress, including patent cases.12 1 However, merely identifying a
determination as factual does not ensure the right to a jury trial
if the question involves an issue that is entirely equitable.'
22
To determine whether a particular action will involve legal
rights that entitle a party to ajury trial, the Supreme Court uses a
117. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(stating that although the doctrine of equivalents extends the claims beyond literal in-
terpretation, the doctrine does not prevent the manufacture, use or sale of every similar
device).
118. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir.
1987). To say that the doctrine of equivalents extends or enlarges the claims is inaccu-
rate. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed.
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990). "The claims ... remain the same and
application of the doctrine expands the right to exclude 'equivalents' of what is claimed."
Id. "Courts can neither broaden nor narrow the claims to give the patentee something
different than what he has set forth." Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d
391, 396 (CI. Ct. 1967), on subsequent appea4 Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106
(1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978).
119. Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950), reh'g
denied, 340 U.S. 845 (1950).
120. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
121. Root v. Railway Co., 105 U.S. 189, 206-7 (1881); see also Swofford v. B & W, Inc.,
336 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965) (stating that when
plaintiffs in an infringement case seek equitable relief they have a right to a jury trial).
122. Paragon Podiatry Laboratory, Inc. v. KLM Laboratories, Inc., 984 F.2d 1182,
1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The issue of the role of the jury in determining equivalence will
be determined by the Federal Circuit in Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. WarnerJenkinson Co.,
Inc., No. 93-1088, 1993 WL 502162 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 3, 1993). The Federal Circuit issued
an order to hear the Hilton case en banc. Among the issues to be addressed in supple-
mental briefs is: "Is the issue of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents an equi-
table remedy to be decided by the court, or is it, like literal infringement, an issue of
fact to be submitted to the jury in a jury case?" Hilton, 1993 WL 502162 at *1.
[Vol. 20
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two-step process: first, an examination of the nature of the issues
involved, and second, an examination of the remedy sought.1 2
Determining the forum of the suit is important because the pat-
entee must meet specific evidentiary thresholds depending on
whether the case is tried to a jury or to a court.
1 24
2. The Tripartite Test
The Graver Tank decision is often credited with formulating
the "function/way/result" test for determining equivalency. 25
The test is consistently reiterated by the Federal Circuit in doc-
trine of equivalents analysis;1 26 "[t] he doctrine of equivalents in-
volves a familiar three-part inquiry. An accused device which
'performs substantially the same overall function or work, in sub-
stantially the same way, to obtain substantially the same overall
result as the claimed invention' . . . is an equivalent." 1 7  The
Federal Circuit has used other methods to determine equiva-
lence, but no other method has been accepted or applied as reg-
ularly as the tripartite test.
1 28
Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents will not be
found if the accused device performs the same function and
achieves the same result but does so in a different way than the
claimed invention. 129 However, the "way" portion of the test may
be met even if the claim limitation has been substituted in the
123. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565
(1990).
124. See infra part IV.C.3.
125. "The ... 'function/way/result' equivalency analysis with respect to a claim limi-
tation appears to be a helpful way to approach the problem and entirely in accord with
the analysis actually made in Graver Tank" Coming Glass Works v. Sumitoms Elec.
U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
126. See, e.g., London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (articulating the standard for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents as a
question of whether the "accused device performs substantially the same function in
the same way to achieve substantially the same results").
127. Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(quoting Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934).
128. See Ronald E. Larson, Balancing the Competing Policies Underlying the Doctrine of
Equivalents in Patent Law, 21 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 6-7, 7 n.28 (1993) (discussing the insuffi-
ciency of the interchangeability doctrine as a standard of equivalency).
129. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 931, 1534-35 (Fed.
Cir. 1987). (holding that the differing methods "permeate[ ] the entire operation of the
claimed invention and cannot be deemed insignificant or insubstantial").
1994]
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accused device.1 3 ' The "element by element" approach must be
applied when analyzing the "way" portion of the test.
13 1
3. Burdens of Proof
The patentee has the burden to show the accused device
performs in a manner that satisfies the tripartite test.1 32 The pat-
entee bears this burden of proving infringement by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.
133
For an accused device to infringe a patent, the patentee must
establish the presence of each and every claimed element or its
substantial equivalent.1 34 To be a substantial equivalent, the ele-
ment substituted in the accused device for the claimed element
must not be such as would substantially change the way in which
the function of the claimed invention is performed.
3 5
130. Read Corp. v. Protec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, Sept.
23, 1992, (recognizing that infringement "requires that each limitation of a claim be
met exactly or by a substantial equivalent").
131. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988) (citing Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551
(Fed. Cir. 1985)). The recent decision of Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d
1320 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2942 (1992) has created further ambiguity
in interpreting the tripartite test. The Malta panel held that when applying the tripar-
tite test, the patentee must also show "why" the function, way, and result of the accused
device are substantially equivalent to the claimed invention. Id. at 1327. Ambiguity
now exists as to whether the "why" requirement is an additional prong of the function/
way/result test (see Malta, 952 F.2d at 1334 (Newman, J., dissenting)) or simply an elab-
oration of the "way" portion of the three-prong test (see id. at 1330 (Michel, J.,
concurring)).
132. See Universal Gym Equip., Inc. v. ERWA Exercise Equip. Ltd., 827 F.2d 1542,
1548 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that showing of substantially similar results does not
create a presumption that the devices do so in a substantially similar way; rather, paten-
tee has burden of showing that the accused device meets all three components of the
equivalency test). As noted above, see supra part IV.C.2, the tripartite test is an accepta-
ble way of showing substantial equivalence when comparing the accused device to the
claimed invention. Also noted above, see supra part IV.B.1, the "element by element"
approach is the method to be used when making the comparison of the accused device
to the claimed invention.
133. See Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
"During an accounting, as during the liability trial, a patentee must prove infringement
by a preponderance of the evidence." Id.
134. E.g., Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
135. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 935 (quoting Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538,
1552-53 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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The patentee must meet a minimum evidentiary threshold in
order to support a primafacie case of infringement in doctrine of
equivalents actions brought before a jury." 6 This standard re-
quires the patentee to prove "substantial identity as to each of
the function, way, and result prongs of the doctrine.""3 7 In ad-
dressing each prong, comparison must be made separately and
explicitly to each in the form of particularized testimony and
linking arguments. 138 This evidentiary threshold requires more
than a cursory presentation of evidence. 3 9
Such a proof requirement is necessary to prevent the jury
from being "put to sea without guiding charts."14° As well, this
evidentiary standard is intended to prevent the jury from deter-
mining infringement by simply comparing the claimed inven-
tion and the accused device on the basis of "overall similarity."
41
b. Bench Trials
Whether similar evidentiary requirements are imposed on
bench trials involving the doctrine of equivalents is less clear.1
42
Such evidentiary requirements are not the standard in doctrine
of equivalents matters tried before the United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission.143 Unlike a typical district court jury,
the International Trade Commission resolves matters involving
136. Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 2942 (1992) (citing Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1426-27).
137. Lear Siegler Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(requiring that jury be directed to isolate proof for each element of the doctrine).
138. Nester Corp. v. Menasha Corp.-Lewis Sys. Div., 739 F.2d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053 (1985) (holding the claim was insufficient because
plaintiff's attorneys and witnesses did not present evidence addressing equivalence
terms of functions, means, and result).
139. Malta, 952 F.2d at 1328 (holding "brief conclusory evidence" is insufficient to
meet the threshold).
140. Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1426 (recognizing that in order for the jury to decide
the factual issue of equivalence, a showing of how plaintiff compares function, means,
and result of its invention with those of the accused device is required).
141. Malta, 952 F.2d at 1327 (citing Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1427). With little gui-
dance, the jury is left to its own imagination on the technical issue of equivalence. Id. at
1327.
142. Janis, supra note 31, at 644-45.
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patent infringement regularly and is cognizant of the doctrine of
equivalents.
144
Although a district court bench may also be aware of the doc-
trine of equivalents, the reasoning behind the evidentiary bur-
dens established in Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc. may be
logically extended to bench trials.145
V. LIMITATIONS ON THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
A. Prior Art
Even if the doctrine of equivalents standards of Graver Tank
and its progeny are met, there can be no infringement if the
scope of equivalency would encompass the prior art.1 46 "[A] pat-
entee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of
equivalents, coverage which he could not lawfully have obtained
from the PTO by literal claims." '47 The prior art limits ex-
panding the right to exclude equivalents. 4 '
Prior art always limits what is patentable or what the inven-
tor could have claimed in the application, including what the
prior art has anticipated '49 or made obvious. 5 ° Thus, prior
144. Id. (recognizing that "[u]nlike a jury in a district court case, the Commission
resolves disputes involving patent infringement matters with some regularity and thus is
aware of doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence").
145. SeeJanis, supra note 31, at 644-45. "[I]t would seem to follow that failure to
meet the threshold proof would subject the patent owner to a Rule 52(c) 'judgment on
partial findings' in a bench trial just as it would subject him to a Rule 50(a) judgment as
a matter of law in a jury trial, or to an adverse summary judgment." Id.
146. Senmed, Inc. v. Richard Allen Medical Ind., Inc., 888 F.2d 815, 821 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (citing Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532
(Fed. Cir. 1987)).
147. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990).
148. Id.
149. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). In order to be patentable, an invention must be novel.
Id. See also Moore v. Stewart, 600 F. Supp. 655 (D.C. Ark. 1985) (holding that appear-
ance of design for which protection is sought must be novel and nonobvious).
150. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). The Wilson Sporting Goods court explicitly held that the
doctrine of equivalents cannot be extended to what is made obvious by the prior art.
904 F.2d at 685. Since prior art limits what an inventor could patent in the first place, it
limits the range of permissible equivalents. In Wilson Sporting Goods, the court concep-
tualized a hypothetical patent claim sufficiently broad in scope to cover the accused
product. Id. at 684. The court then examined whether that claim could have been
allowed by the PTO over prior art. Id. The court compared the hypothetical claim and
the prior art and concluded that there was "no principled difference" between the hy-
pothetical claim and the prior art product. Id. at 685. Any difference between the
hypothetical claim and the prior art product was so minor that the hypothetical claim
would have been obvious in view of the prior art. Id.
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art should limit the range of permissible equivalents of a
claim.
1 5 1
To determine if the claimed equivalency would encompass the
prior art, the Federal Circuit utilizes the "hypothetical claim"
analysis.1 52 The hypothetical claim is created sufficiently broad
in scope to literally cover the accused device. 153 If the hypotheti-
cal claim would be allowed by the PTO over the prior art, "then
prior art is not a bar to infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents."1 5 14 If the hypothetical claim would not be allowed
because of the prior art, then to allow the patentee to obtain
protection would be improper.
1 55
The issue of whether a claimed equivalency would encompass
the prior art is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.' 56 Fur-
thermore, the burden is on the patentee asserting the claimed
equivalency to prove that the claimed equivalency does not en-
compass the prior art.157 This burden does not, however, under-
mine the presumed validity of the patent claims. 158
B. Prosecution History Estoppel
Another limitation on the application of the doctrine of
equivalents is prosecution history estoppel. Prosecution history
estoppel is an affirmative defense to be pled by the accused in-
fringer 159 and is a question of law." Prosecution history estop-
pel will not allow the patentee to recapture through the doctrine
151. Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684.
152. Id. at 685. The hypothetical claim is a helpful, but not mandatory, way for the
patentee to show that the claimed equivalency would not encompass the prior art. Key
Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The use of the
term "hypothetical claim" serves to emphasize that the patentee is seeking coverage
beyond the limits considered by the PTO examiner. Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at
685.
153. Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684.
154. Id. (emphasis omitted).
155. Id. The court recognized "[t]he doctrine of equivalents exists to prevent a fraud
on a patent, not to give a patentee something he could not lawfully have obtained from
the PTO had he tried." Id. (citation omitted).
156. Id. at 683 (presuming, however, that the jury resolved the evidentiary conflicts
in the plaintiff's favor).
157. Id. at 685. The court recognized that patent owners always have the burden of
proving infringement and that there is no logical reason to displace this general rule
simply because infringement might require an examination of the patentability of the
proposed hypothetical claim. Id. The court reasoned that any other approach would
ignore and violate existing patent law. Id.
158. Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 685.
159. Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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of equivalents certain coverage surrendered during prosecution
of the patent application.1 61
The prosecution history, or file wrapper, 162 includes material
representations made to the PTO in response to references cited
by the examiner.16 - Such material representations may be
amendments, statements, remarks, or replies made to obtain a
patent.164 The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel bars a
patentee from construing the claims in a manner that would re-
capture the subject matter surrendered in the material represen-
tations made to the examiner.
65
Application of the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is
performed on a case by case basis and is guided by equitable
principles. 66 Reversible error results when a trial court con-
cludes that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be invoked simply
because the claims have been narrowed. 167 The prosecution his-
160. LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 867 F.2d 1572, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
161. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
162. The Federal Circuit has indicated a preference for the phraseology "prosecu-
tion history estoppel" over "file wrapper estoppel."'Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp.,
730 F.2d 1476, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 924 (1984).
163. The Federal Circuit has stated that prosecution history is irrelevant where there
is literal infringement. Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1571
(Fed. Cir. 1983). The same matters used to determine prosecution history estoppel,
however, may be used to interpret the claims during the first step of infringement anal-
ysis. See supra part II.B.
164. See Townsend Eng'r Co. v. HiTec Co., 829 F.2d 1086, 1090-91 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
165. Loctite, 781 F.2d at 870. But see Durango Assoc., Inc. v. Reflange, Inc., 843 F.2d
1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (prosecution history estoppel does not necessarily mean
the patentee is completely prohibited from recapturing what was originally
surrendered).
In Durango, application claim 2 was amended during prosecution to include a limi-
tation. This amendment had no effect on claim 3, which was the subject of the dispute.
Claim 3 was based on application claim 7. Although application claim 7 originally de-
pended on application claim 2, application claim 7 was deemed allowable by the exam-
iner prior to the amendment of application claim 2. "The subsequent addition of
limitations to application claim 2 to obtain its allowance has no effect on the interpreta-
tion of application claim 7 and, therefore, no effect on claim 3." Id. at 1358.
166. See, e.g., Insta-Foam Prod., Inc. v. Universal Foam Sys., Inc., 906 F.2d 698, 702
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting infringement analysis under doctrine of equivalents is equita-
ble analysis).
167. Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar Int'l Research B.V., 738 F.2d 1237, 1243
(Fed. Cir. 1984). The court recognized that just because claims were narrowed does
not mean the doctrine of history estoppel completely prevents a patentee from recap-
turing some of the original claim. Id. Thus, limiting the claims because of a restrictive
requirement would not of necessity involve file history estoppel. Id. If ajudge decides
solely on an erroneous consideration of the law, this would be error. Id.
1056 [Vol. 20
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Pioneer status regards the position of the invention in the art
to which the invention pertains. 169 A pioneer invention is de-
void of significant prior art, although it may be a combination of
old elements. 17 ° Nonpioneer inventions are merely improve-
ments in a crowded field.
17 1
Historically, pioneer inventions were entitled to liberal con-
struction of the claims in doctrine of equivalents analysis.
72
Claims for a nonpioneer invention would receive a narrower in-
terpretation. 7  The Federal Circuit, however, apparently does
not regard the status of the invention as significant. 74 This posi-
tion is evidenced by the Circuit's recognition that a pioneer in-
vention does not have the status of a separate class of invention
subject to laws that are only applicable to pioneer inventions.
75
168. Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 976 (1993).
169. Mac Corp. of Am. v. Williams Patent Crusher Co., 767 F.2d 882, 884 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
170. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558,
1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 846 F.2d 1369 (1988). An overwhelming percentage
of inventions are merely new combinations of old, known elements. See supra note 114
and accompanying text.
171. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 945, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
172. Id. (citing Morley Sewing Machine Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263, 273 (1889)).
173. See Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip., 872 F.2d 978, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1989), reh'g
denied, May 2, 1989 (noting "[t]he concept of 'pioneer' arises from an ancient jurispru-
dence, reflecting judicial appreciation that a broad breakthrough invention merits a
broader scope of equivalents than does a narrow improvement in a crowded
technology").
174. See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 863 F.2d 855, 861 (Fed.
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1068 (1989).
It is not necessary, of course, that an inventor be entitled to a broad claim
covering all possible products in a line of products before a court may award
an invention pioneer status ... or a range of equivalents sufficient to encom-
pass a particular accused product. It is commonplace for claims to inventions,
pioneer and non-pioneer, to be amended during prosecution. Though the
'area of equivalence' may vary, the doctrine of equivalents is applicable to
both.
Id. (citations omitted). But see Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822
F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987). "A pioneer invention is entitled to a broad range of
equivalents." Id. (citations omitted).
175. Sun Studs, 872 F.2d at 987.
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The role of the status of the invention in doctrine of
equivalents analysis is uncertain, if any role exists at all. There
are wide ranges of technological advances that may arise be-
tween a pioneering breakthrough and any given improvement of
the claimed invention and these ranges allow for distinguishing
gradations of equivalency. 176 Consequently, a particular inven-
tion's position on this equivalency spectrum is dependent on all
the circumstances in each particular case.
17 7
B. Means-Plus-Function Language
As previously noted, the Patent Act provides explicit guide-
lines for interpretation of claim elements expressed in means-
plus-function terms.' 78 Section 112, paragraph 6 allows broad
means-plus-function terms, but at the same time provides a stan-
dard that makes the language less ambiguous and subject to
more definitive interpretation.
1 79
According to the first clause of section 112, paragraph 6, the
applicant need not recite structure, material, or acts in the
claim's means-plus-function limitation. 80 The second clause of
section 112, paragraph 6, however, places a limiting condition
on the use of the language.' 8 ' The second clause limits the ap-
plicant to structure, material, or acts in the specification or their
equivalents. 8 2 Thus, section 112, paragraph 6 acts as a reverse
176. Id. at 987 (citing Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n,
846 F.2d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
177. Id. (citing Royer v. Schultz Belting Co., 135 U.S. 319, 325 (1890)).
178. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
179. See Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir.
1993). The United States Supreme Court had initially prohibited the use of means-
plus-function language in describing the key element in a combination claim. Id. at
1042 (citing Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 9 (1946)). The
Court was concerned that such language was both overbroad and ambiguous. Id. Con-
gress responded by enacting § 112 of the 1952 Patent Act that expressly permitted the
use of means-plus-function language. Valmon4 983 F.2d at 1042.
180. Valmont, 983 F.2d at 1042. See supra note 39 and accompanying text for the text
of§ 112,1 6.
181. The second clause serves to necessarily limit the breadth of the means-plus-
function claim limitation, as a literal reading of a means-plus-function claim element
can potentially include all possible means for performing the claimed function. Id. at
1042 (citing Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
182. The second clause of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 (1988) provides: "such claim shall be
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the speci-
fication and equivalents thereof." Id. (emphasis added). The second clause relates pri-
marily to the construction of such claims for the purpose of infringement, and the
second clause should not have much applicability in determining the patentability of
such claims over the prior art. P.J. Federico, Preface to 35 U.S.C. §§ 1, 25 (1954).
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doctrine of equivalents by restricting the coverage of the literal
claim language.' 3
As currently applied, equivalency under section 112, para-
graph 6 is not the same as the doctrine of equivalents. 18 4 Section
112, paragraph 6 limits the broad language of means-plus-func-
tion clauses in combination claims to equivalents of structures,
materials, or acts in the specification.'85 On the other hand, the
doctrine of equivalents equitably expands patent rights to
equivalents not necessarily detailed in the specification.
18 6
According to the Federal Circuit, one must not confuse
"equivalents" as utilized in section 112, paragraph 6, with the
doctrine of equivalents." 7 "If the required function is not per-
formed exactly in the accused device," the section 112, para-
graph 6 equivalency requirement is not satisfied. 88 However, an
equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents may not literally
meet the claim, yet still infringe the patent.'89
Nevertheless, although the Pennwalt court held that section
112, paragraph 6 "plays no role in determining whether an
equivalent function is performed by the accused device under
183. Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989). "Properly un-
derstood section 1121 6 operates more like the reverse doctrine of equivalents than the
doctrine of equivalents because it restricts the scope of the literal claim language." Id.
184. Valmoni 983 F.2d at 1043-44.
The doctrine of equivalents has a different purpose and application than sec-
tion 112. The doctrine of equivalents prevents a copyist from evading patent
claims with insubstantial changes.
[S]ection 112, 6, and the doctrine of equivalents have separate origins and
purposes. Section 112, 1 6, limits the broad language of means-plus-function
limitations in combination claims to equivalents of the structures, materials, or
acts in the specification. The doctrine of equivalents equitably expands exclu-
sive patent rights."
Id.
185. See supra note 183.
186. Valmont 983 F.2d at 1043-44. "An equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents
results from an insubstantial change which, from the perspective of one of ordinary skill
in the art, adds nothing of significance to the claimed invention. An equivalent under
the doctrine of equivalents, though not literally meeting the claims, still infringes the
patent." Id. (citation omitted).
187. D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that
doctrine of equivalents analysis requires determination whether accused device meets
the three-part doctrine of equivalents test, while § 112, 1 6 provides a basis for deter-
mining a single question of whether or not the means of the accused device performs
the function of the claim in the same or equivalent manner).
188. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988). If an accused structure performs the function required
by the claim, it is not necessarily structurally equivalent. Id.
189. Valmont, 983 F.2d at 1043.
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the doctrine of equivalents,"190 such a conclusion neglects to ac-
knowledge the role of the second clause of section 112, para-
graph 6 in claim interpretation.
Before making an infringement determination, the court
must properly interpret the claims. 1 ' For claims with means-
plus-function language, section 112, paragraph 6 is employed for
claim interpretation.1 92  The same interpretation is made
whether subsequently determining literal infringement or in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 9 '
Recently, the Federal Circuit held that the PTO may no longer
read means-plus-function elements as broadly as reasonably
proper or independently of any structure set out in the specifica-
tion.19 4 Instead, paragraph 6 applies in all contexts where the
interpretation of means-plus-function language arises, either in
prosecution in the PTO or in enforcement in the courts. 195 This
may signal a new court direction towards requiring that all cases
of means-plus-function equivalents be interpreted in the same
manner.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CLARIFYING THE DOCTRINE
In the past several years, the Federal Circuit has made great
strides in developing the structure of an analysis that outlines
the issues surrounding application of the doctrine of equivalents
in patent infringement litigation. Unfortunately, uncertainty re-
mains in every issue of the doctrine of equivalents as currently
applied. Furthermore, Federal Circuit judges themselves do not
agree on the application of the doctrine.'96
190. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934.
191. Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(recognizing that improperly construing a claim may distort infringement analysis).
192. See Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating
"[s]ection 112, 1 6 provides direction with respect to how the part of a claim framed in
means-plus-function language must be interpreted within an infringement analysis")
(citation omitted).
193. Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Medical Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815, 818 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
194. In re Donaldson Co., Inc., 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
195. Id. at 1193.
196. See, Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 959 F.2d 923, 923 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2942 (1992) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of hearing en
banc); see also Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir.
1991), reh' denied, 959 F.2d 923 (1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2942 (1992) (Newman,J.,
dissenting) (arguing that majority's holding that plaintiff was required to also show
"why" to establish infringement under doctrine of equivalents analysis "creates a new
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The doctrine remains an equitable remedy. As an equitable
doctrine, the prevailing uncertainty allows the court to do equity
as necessary and this power should not be taken away from the
courts. Any legislative orjudicial guidelines that restrict the doc-
trine to a mechanistic formula could conceivably remove certain
types of infringement from the purview of the doctrine. Ex-
panding the section 112, paragraph 6 standard of "equivalent"
and eliminating, or greatly reducing, the application of the doc-
trine of equivalents would abolish the equitable "as a whole" na-
ture of the doctrine in circumstances when such an analysis is
necessary and appropriate.
97
Other suggestions have been presented, such as placing the
invention on a copy-independent spectrum.198 The spectrum
would range from one end, where the accused device was crafted
independent of the claimed invention, to the other end, where
the claimed invention was clearly copied by the accused
device. 199
Such an evaluation may, however, penalize those who "design
around" the claimed invention, a worthwhile consideration if in-
deed "designing around" is a practice to be encouraged and con-
sidered beneficial to society. On the other hand, the
implementation of the spectrum may not work against those who
"design around" inventions any more than the current applica-
tion of the doctrine of equivalents.
Another suggestion is a combination of the "element by ele-
ment" approach and the "as a whole" approach. 20 0 The court in
Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc.2° 1 upheld an application
of the "element by element" approach when conducting the tri-
partite test followed by a consideration of the overall similarity
between the accused device and the claimed invention. 2  This
"overall similarity" analytical approach would allow the court to
make an equitable determination after applying the current
substantive and procedural rule of uncertain soundness, as well as treading upon due
process").
197. See supra part IV.B.2.
198. See International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., Inc., 991 F.2d 768, 775
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (Lourie, J., concurring); Wegner, supra note 70 at 71.
199. Wegner, supra note 70, at 71.
200. See Paul N. Katz, The Federal Circuit, in Determining Whether Patent Infringement
Exists, is Divided Over Whether to Utilize "As-a-Whole" or "Element-by-Element" Analysis When
Applying the Doctrine of Equivalents, 30 S. TEX. L. REv. 441, 463 (1989).
201. 922 F.2d 792 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
202. Id. at 798.
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mechanistic analysis.2 °3 Combining the two approaches into one
that would examine the overall degree of similarity may result in
a more predictable infringement determination under the doc-
trine of equivalents. 20 4 Adding this "overall similarity" test to the




The doctrine of equivalents was developed to prevent fraud on
the patent and the unscrupulous copyist from making insubstan-
tial changes that, though adding nothing, were enough to take
the device outside the scope of the claims. As such, the doctrine
was considered the exception and not the rule.
Today, the doctrine of equivalents is a readily available means
of protecting patent rights, and the second prong of patent in-
fringement litigation. Any guidelines developed to remove ambi-
guity must, at the very least, articulate the scope of the
protection available in order to clarify the underlying policy be-
hind the doctrine of equivalents. To paraphrase one great phi-
losopher, if we don't know where we're going, we'll wind up
someplace else.20 6
203. International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., Inc., 991 F.2d 768, 775
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (Lourie, J., concurring) (listing a number of alternative approaches to
doctrine of equivalents analysis).
204. Katz, supra note 200, at 463.
205. See Int'l Visual Corp., 991 F.2d at 775 (Lourie, J., concurring); see also Collins,
supra note 104, at 303 (citing Katz, The Federal Circuit, in Determining Whether Patent In-
fringement Exists, is Divided Over Whether to Utilize "As-a-Whole" or "Element-by-Element"Analy-
sis When Applying the Doctrine of Equivalents, 30 S. TEX L.J. 441, 463 (1989)).
206. The great philosopher was Yogi Berra.
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